|
Explorers, Scientists &
Inventors
Musicians, Painters &
Artists
Poets, Writers &
Philosophers
Native Americans & The Wild
West
First Ladies
Popes
Troublemakers
Historians
Archaeologists
Royal
Families
Tribes & Peoples
Assassinations in History
Who
got slain, almost slain, when, how,
why, and by whom?
Go to the
Assassination Archive
Online History Dictionary A - Z
Voyages in History
When did what
vessel arrive with whom onboard and where
did it sink if it didn't?
Go to the
Passage-Chart
The Divine Almanac
Who all roamed the heavens in
olden times? The Who's Who of
ancient gods.
Check out
the Divine Almanac
|
|
The History of the Peloponnesian War
Book 7 - Chapter XXII
|
|
Nineteenth Year of the War - Arrival of Demosthenes - Defeat of
the Athenians at Epipolae - Folly and Obstinancy of Nicias
In the meantime, while the Syracusans were preparing for a second
attack upon both elements, Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrived with
the succours from Athens, consisting of about seventy-three ships,
including the foreigners; nearly five thousand heavy infantry,
Athenian and allied; a large number of darters, Hellenic and
barbarian, and slingers and archers and everything else upon a
corresponding scale. The Syracusans and their allies were for the
moment not a little dismayed at the idea that there was to be no
term or ending to their dangers, seeing, in spite of the fortification
of Decelea, a new army arrive nearly equal to the former, and the
power of Athens proving so great in every quarter. On the other
hand, the first Athenian armament regained a certain confidence in the
midst of its misfortunes. Demosthenes, seeing how matters stood,
felt that he could not drag on and fare as Nicias had done, who by
wintering in Catana instead of at once attacking Syracuse had
allowed the terror of his first arrival to evaporate in contempt,
and had given time to Gylippus to arrive with a force from
Peloponnese, which the Syracusans would never have sent for if he
had attacked immediately; for they fancied that they were a match
for him by themselves, and would not have discovered their inferiority
until they were already invested, and even if they then sent for
succours, they would no longer have been equally able to profit by
their arrival. Recollecting this, and well aware that it was now on
the first day after his arrival that he like Nicias was most
formidable to the enemy, Demosthenes determined to lose no time in
drawing the utmost profit from the consternation at the moment
inspired by his army; and seeing that the counterwall of the
Syracusans, which hindered the Athenians from
|
investing them, was a single one, and that he who should become
master of the way up to Epipolae, and afterwards of the camp there, would find no difficulty
in taking it, as no one would even wait for his attack, made all haste
to attempt the enterprise. This he took to be the shortest way of
ending the war, as he would either succeed and take Syracuse, or would
lead back the armament instead of frittering away the lives of the
Athenians engaged in the expedition and the resources of the country
at large.
First therefore the Athenians went out and laid waste the lands of
the Syracusans about the Anapus and carried all before them as at
first by land and by sea, the Syracusans not offering to oppose them
upon either element, unless it were with their cavalry and darters
from the Olympieum. Next Demosthenes resolved to attempt the
counterwall first by means of engines. As however the engines that
he brought up were burnt by the enemy fighting from the wall, and
the rest of the forces repulsed after attacking at many different
points, he determined to delay no longer, and having obtained the
consent of Nicias and his fellow commanders, proceeded to put in
execution his plan of attacking Epipolae. As by day it seemed
impossible to approach and get up without being observed, he ordered
provisions for five days, took all the masons and carpenters, and
other things, such as arrows, and everything else that they could want
for the work of fortification if successful, and, after the first
watch, set out with Eurymedon and Menander and the whole army for
Epipolae, Nicias being left behind in the lines. Having come up by the
hill of Euryelus (where the former army had ascended at first)
unobserved by the enemy's guards, they went up to the fort which the
Syracusans had there, and took it, and put to the sword part of the
garrison. The greater number, however, escaped at once and gave the
alarm to the camps, of which there were three upon Epipolae,
defended by outworks, one of the Syracusans, one of the other
Siceliots, and one of the allies; and also to the six hundred
Syracusans forming the original garrison for this part of Epipolae.
These at once advanced against the assailants and, falling in with
Demosthenes and the Athenians, were routed by them after a sharp
resistance, the victors immediately pushing on, eager to achieve the
objects of the attack without giving time for their ardour to cool;
meanwhile others from the very beginning were taking the counterwall
of the Syracusans, which was abandoned by its garrison, and pulling
down the battlements. The Syracusans and the allies, and Gylippus with
the troops under his command, advanced to the rescue from the
outworks, but engaged in some consternation (a night attack being a
piece of audacity which they had never expected), and were at first
compelled to retreat. But while the Athenians, flushed with their
victory, now advanced with less order, wishing to make their way as
quickly as possible through the whole force of the enemy not yet
engaged, without relaxing their attack or giving them time to rally,
the Boeotians made the first stand against them, attacked them, routed
them, and put them to flight.
The Athenians now fell into great disorder and perplexity, so that
it was not easy to get from one side or the other any detailed account
of the affair. By day certainly the combatants have a clearer
notion, though even then by no means of all that takes place, no one
knowing much of anything that does not go on in his own immediate
neighbourhood; but in a night engagement (and this was the only one
that occurred between great armies during the war) how could any one
know anything for certain? Although there was a bright moon they saw
each other only as men do by moonlight, that is to say, they could
distinguish the form of the body, but could not tell for certain
whether it was a friend or an enemy. Both had great numbers of heavy
infantry moving about in a small space. Some of the Athenians were
already defeated, while others were coming up yet unconquered for
their first attack. A large part also of the rest of their forces
either had only just got up, or were still ascending, so that they did
not know which way to march. Owing to the rout that had taken place
all in front was now in confusion, and the noise made it difficult
to distinguish anything. The victorious Syracusans and allies were
cheering each other on with loud cries, by night the only possible
means of communication, and meanwhile receiving all who came against
them; while the Athenians were seeking for one another, taking all
in front of them for enemies, even although they might be some of
their now flying friends; and by constantly asking for the
watchword, which was their only means of recognition, not only
caused great confusion among themselves by asking all at once, but
also made it known to the enemy, whose own they did not so readily
discover, as the Syracusans were victorious and not scattered, and
thus less easily mistaken. The result was that if the Athenians fell
in with a party of the enemy that was weaker than they, it escaped
them through knowing their watchword; while if they themselves
failed to answer they were put to the sword. But what hurt them as
much, or indeed more than anything else, was the singing of the paean,
from the perplexity which it caused by being nearly the same on either
side; the Argives and Corcyraeans and any other Dorian peoples in
the army, struck terror into the Athenians whenever they raised
their paean, no less than did the enemy. Thus, after being once thrown
into disorder, they ended by coming into collision with each other
in many parts of the field, friends with friends, and citizens with
citizens, and not only terrified one another, but even came to blows
and could only be parted with difficulty. In the pursuit many perished
by throwing themselves down the cliffs, the way down from Epipolae
being narrow; and of those who got down safely into the plain,
although many, especially those who belonged to the first armament,
escaped through their better acquaintance with the locality, some of
the newcomers lost their way and wandered over the country, and were
cut off in the morning by the Syracusan cavalry and killed.
The next day the Syracusans set up two trophies, one upon Epipolae
where the ascent had been made, and the other on the spot where the
first check was given by the Boeotians; and the Athenians took back
their dead under truce. A great many of the Athenians and allies
were killed, although still more arms were taken than could be
accounted for by the number of the dead, as some of those who were
obliged to leap down from the cliffs without their shields escaped
with their lives and did not perish like the rest.
After this the Syracusans, recovering their old confidence at such
an unexpected stroke of good fortune, dispatched Sicanus with
fifteen ships to Agrigentum where there was a revolution, to induce if
possible the city to join them; while Gylippus again went by land into
the rest of Sicily to bring up reinforcements, being now in hope of
taking the Athenian lines by storm, after the result of the affair
on Epipolae.
In the meantime the Athenian generals consulted upon the disaster
which had happened, and upon the general weakness of the army. They
saw themselves unsuccessful in their enterprises, and the soldiers
disgusted with their stay; disease being rife among them owing to
its being the sickly season of the year, and to the marshy and
unhealthy nature of the spot in which they were encamped; and the
state of their affairs generally being thought desperate. Accordingly,
Demosthenes was of opinion that they ought not to stay any longer; but
agreeably to his original idea in risking the attempt upon Epipolae,
now that this had failed, he gave his vote for going away without
further loss of time, while the sea might yet be crossed, and their
late reinforcement might give them the superiority at all events on
that element. He also said that it would be more profitable for the
state to carry on the war against those who were building
fortifications in Attica, than against the Syracusans whom it was no
longer easy to subdue; besides which it was not right to squander
large sums of money to no purpose by going on with the siege.
This was the opinion of Demosthenes. Nicias, without denying the bad
state of their affairs, was unwilling to avow their weakness, or to
have it reported to the enemy that the Athenians in full council
were openly voting for retreat; for in that case they would be much
less likely to effect it when they wanted without discovery. Moreover,
his own particular information still gave him reason to hope that
the affairs of the enemy would soon be in a worse state than their
own, if the Athenians persevered in the siege; as they would wear
out the Syracusans by want of money, especially with the more
extensive command of the sea now given them by their present navy.
Besides this, there was a party in Syracuse who wished to betray the
city to the Athenians, and kept sending him messages and telling him
not to raise the siege. Accordingly, knowing this and really waiting
because he hesitated between the two courses and wished to see his way
more clearly, in his public speech on this occasion he refused to lead
off the army, saying he was sure the Athenians would never approve
of their returning without a vote of theirs. Those who would vote upon
their conduct, instead of judging the facts as eye-witnesses like
themselves and not from what they might hear from hostile critics,
would simply be guided by the calumnies of the first clever speaker;
while many, indeed most, of the soldiers on the spot, who now so
loudly proclaimed the danger of their position, when they reached
Athens would proclaim just as loudly the opposite, and would say
that their generals had been bribed to betray them and return. For
himself, therefore, who knew the Athenian temper, sooner than perish
under a dishonourable charge and by an unjust sentence at the hands of
the Athenians, he would rather take his chance and die, if die he
must, a soldier's death at the hand of the enemy. Besides, after
all, the Syracusans were in a worse case than themselves. What with
paying mercenaries, spending upon fortified posts, and now for a
full year maintaining a large navy, they were already at a loss and
would soon be at a standstill: they had already spent two thousand
talents and incurred heavy debts besides, and could not lose even ever
so small a fraction of their present force through not paying it,
without ruin to their cause; depending as they did more upon
mercenaries than upon soldiers obliged to serve, like their own. He
therefore said that they ought to stay and carry on the siege, and not
depart defeated in point of money, in which they were much superior.
Nicias spoke positively because he had exact information of the
financial distress at Syracuse, and also because of the strength of
the Athenian party there which kept sending him messages not to
raise the siege; besides which he had more confidence than before in
his fleet, and felt sure at least of its success. Demosthenes,
however, would not hear for a moment of continuing the siege, but said
that if they could not lead off the army without a decree from Athens,
and if they were obliged to stay on, they ought to remove to Thapsus
or Catana; where their land forces would have a wide extent of country
to overrun, and could live by plundering the enemy, and would thus
do them damage; while the fleet would have the open sea to fight in,
that is to say, instead of a narrow space which was all in the enemy's
favour, a wide sea-room where their science would be of use, and where
they could retreat or advance without being confined or
circumscribed either when they put out or put in. In any case he was
altogether opposed to their staying on where they were, and insisted
on removing at once, as quickly and with as little delay as
possible; and in this judgment Eurymedon agreed. Nicias however
still objecting, a certain diffidence and hesitation came over them,
with a suspicion that Nicias might have some further information to
make him so positive.
More History
|
