Listen to an mp3 excerpt of the Finest Hour speech.
It follows the full text transcript of
Winston Churchill's Finest Hour speech, delivered
to the House of Commons, London, UK -
June 18, 1940.
I spoke the other
day of the colossal military disaster which
occurred when the French High Command failed to
withdraw the northern Armies from Belgium at the
moment when they knew that the French front was
decisively broken at Sedan and on the Meuse.
I spoke the other
day of the colossal military disaster which
occurred when the French High Command failed to
withdraw the northern Armies from Belgium at the
moment when they knew that the French front was
decisively broken at Sedan and on the Meuse.
This delay entailed the loss of fifteen or
sixteen French divisions and threw out of action
for the critical period the whole of the British
Expeditionary Force. Our Army and 120,000 French
troops were indeed rescued by the British Navy
from Dunkirk but only with the loss of their
cannon, vehicles and modern equipment. This loss
inevitably took some weeks to repair, and in the
first two of those weeks the battle in France
has been lost. When we consider the heroic
resistance made by the French Army against heavy
odds in this battle, the enormous losses
inflicted upon the enemy and the evident
exhaustion of the enemy, it may well be the
thought that these 25 divisions of the
best-trained and best-equipped troops might have
turned the scale. However, General Weygand had
to fight without them. Only three British
divisions or their equivalent were able to stand
in the line with their French comrades. They
have suffered severely, but they have fought
well. We sent every man we could to France as
fast as we could re-equip and transport their
formations.
I am not reciting these facts for the purpose of
recrimination. That I judge to be utterly futile
and even harmful. We cannot afford it. I recite
them in order to explain why it was we did not
have, as we could have had, between twelve and
fourteen British divisions fighting in the line
in this great battle instead of only three. Now
I put all this aside. I put it on the shelf,
from which the historians, when they have time,
will select their documents to tell their
stories. We have to think of the future and not
of the past. This also applies in a small way to
our own affairs at home. There are many who
would hold an inquest in the House of Commons on
the conduct of the Governments-and of
Parliaments, for they are in it, too-during the
years which led up to this catastrophe. They
seek to indict those who were responsible for
the guidance of our affairs. This also would be
a foolish and pernicious process. There are too
many in it. Let each man search his conscience
and search his speeches. I frequently search
mine.
Of this I am quite sure, that if we open a
quarrel between the past and the present, we
shall find that we have lost the future.
Therefore, I cannot accept the drawing of any
distinctions between Members of the present
Government. It was formed at a moment of crisis
in order to unite all the Parties and all
sections of opinion. It has received the almost
unanimous support of both Houses of Parliament.
Its Members are going to stand together, and,
subject to the authority of the House of
Commons, we are going to govern the country and
fight the war. It is absolutely necessary at a
time like this that every Minister who tries
each day to do his duty shall be respected; and
their subordinates must know that their chiefs
are not threatened men, men who are here today
and gone tomorrow, but that their directions
must be punctually and faithfully obeyed.
Without this concentrated power we cannot face
what lies before us. I should not think it would
be very advantageous for the House to prolong
this Debate this afternoon under conditions of
public stress. Many facts are not clear that
will be clear in a short time. We are to have a
secret Session on Thursday, and I should think
that would be a better opportunity for the many
earnest expressions of opinion which Members
will desire to make and for the House to discuss
vital matters without having everything read the
next morning by our dangerous foes.
The disastrous military events which have
happened during the past fortnight have not come
to me with any sense of surprise. Indeed, I
indicated a fortnight ago as clearly as I could
to the House that the worst possibilities were
open; and I made it perfectly clear then that
whatever happened in France would make no
difference to the resolve of Britain and the
British Empire to fight on, '~f necessary for
years, if necessary alone." During the last few
days we have successfully brought off the great
majority of the troops we had on the line of
communication in France; and seven-eighths of
the troops we have sent to France since the
beginning of the war-that is to say, about
350,000 out of 400,000 men-are safely back in
this country. Others are still fighting with the
French, and fighting with considerable success
in their local encounters against the enemy. We
have also brought back a great mass of stores,
rifles and munitions of all kinds which had been
accumulated in France during the last nine
months.
We have, therefore, in this Island today a very
large and powerful military force. This force
comprises all our best-trained and our finest
troops, including scores of thousands of those
who have already measured their quality against
the Germans and found themselves at no
disadvantage. We have under arms at the present
time in this Island over a million and a quarter
men. Behind these we have the Local Defense
Volunteers, numbering half a million, only a
portion of whom, however, are yet armed with
rifles or other firearms. We have incorporated
into our Defense Forces every man for whom we
have a weapon. We expect very large additions to
our weapons in the near future, and in
preparation for this we intend forthwith to call
up, drill and train further large numbers. Those
who are not called up, or else are employed
during the vast business of munitions production
in all its branches-and their ramifications are
innumerable-will serve their country best by
remaining at their ordinary work until they
receive their summons. We have also over here
Dominions armies. The Canadians had actually
landed in France, but have now been safely
withdrawn, much disappointed, but in perfect
order, with all their artillery and equipment.
And these very high-class forces from the
Dominions will now take part in the defense of
the Mother Country.
Lest the account which I have given of these
large forces should raise the question: Why did
they not take part in the great battle in
France? I must make it clear that, apart from
the divisions training and organizing at home,
only 12 divisions were equipped to fight upon a
scale which justified their being sent abroad.
And this was fully up to the number which the
French had been led to expect would be available
in France at the ninth month of the war. The
rest of our forces at home have a fighting value
for home defense which will, of course, steadily
increase every week that passes. Thus, the
invasion of Great Britain would at this time
require the transportation across the sea of
hostile armies on a very large scale, and after
they had been so transported they would have to
be continually maintained with all the masses of
munitions and supplies which are required for
continuous battle-as continuous battle it will
surely be.
Here is where we come to the Navy-and after all,
we have a Navy. Some people seem to forget that
we have a Navy. We must remind them. For the
last thirty years I have been concerned in
discussions about the possibilities of oversea
invasion, and I took the responsibility on
behalf of the Admiralty, at the beginning of the
last war, of allowing all regular troops to be
sent out of the country. That was a very serious
step to take, because our Territorials had only
just been called up and were quite untrained.
Therefore, this Island was for several months
particularly denuded of fighting troops. The
Admiralty had confidence at that time in their
ability to prevent a mass invasion even though
at that time the Germans had a magnificent
battle fleet in the proportion of 10 to 16, even
though they were capable of fighting a general
engagement every day and any day, whereas now
they have only a couple of heavy ships worth
speaking of-the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau.
We are also told that the Italian Navy is to
come out and gain sea superiority in these
waters. If they seriously intend it, I shall
only say that we shall be delighted to offer
Signor Mussolini a free and safeguarded passage
through the Strait of Gibraltar in order that he
may play the part to which he aspires. There is
a general curiosity in the British Fleet to find
out whether the Italians are up to the level
they were at in the last war or whether they
have fallen off at all.
Therefore, it seems to me that as far as
sea-borne invasion on a great scale is
concerned, we are far more capable of meeting it
today than we were at many periods in the last
war and during the early months of this war,
before our other troops were trained, and while
the B.E.F. had proceeded abroad. Now, the Navy
have never pretended to be able to prevent raids
by bodies of 5,000 or 10,000 men flung suddenly
across and thrown ashore at several points on
the coast some dark night or foggy morning. The
efficacy of sea power, especially under modern
conditions, depends upon the invading force
being of large size; It has to be of large size,
in view of our military strength, to be of any
use. If it is of large size, then the Navy have
something they can find and meet and, as it
were, bite on. Now, we must remember that even
five divisions, however lightly equipped, would
require 200 to 250 ships, and with modern air
reconnaissance and photography it would not be
easy to collect such an armada, marshal it, and
conduct it across the sea without any powerful
naval forces to escort it; and there would be
very great possibilities, to put it mildly, that
this armada would be intercepted long before it
reached the coast, and all the men drowned in
the sea or, at the worst blown to pieces with
their equipment while they were trying to land.
We also have a great system of minefields,
recently strongly reinforced, through which we
alone know the channels. If the enemy tries to
sweep passages through these minefields, it will
be the task of the Navy to destroy the
mine-sweepers and any other forces employed to
protect them. There should be no difficulty in
this, owing to our great superiority at sea.
Those are the regular, well-tested, well-proved
arguments on which we have relied during many
years in peace and war. But the question is
whether there are any new methods by which those
solid assurances can be circumvented. Odd as it
may seem, some attention has been given to this
by the Admiralty, whose prime duty and
responsibility is to destroy any large sea-borne
expedition before it reaches, or at the moment
when it reaches, these shores. It would not be a
good thing for me to go into details of this. It
might suggest ideas to other people which they
have not thought of, and they would not be
likely to give us any of their ideas in
exchange. All I will say is that untiring
vigilance and mind-searching must be devoted to
the subject, because the enemy is crafty and
cunning and full of novel treacheries and
stratagems. The House may be assured that the
utmost ingenuity is being displayed and
imagination is being evoked from large numbers
of competent officers, well-trained in tactics
and thoroughly up to date, to measure and
counterwork novel possibilities. Untiring
vigilance and untiring searching of the mind is
being, and must be, devoted to the subject,
because, remember, the enemy is crafty and there
is no dirty trick he will not do.
Some people will ask why, then, was it that the
British Navy was not able to prevent the
movement of a large army from Germany into
Norway across the Skagerrak? But the conditions
in the Channel and in the North Sea are in no
way like those which prevail in the Skagerrak.
In the Skagerrak, because of the distance, we
could give no air support to our surface ships,
and consequently, lying as we did close to the
enemy's main air power, we were compelled to use
only our submarines. We could not enforce the
decisive blockade or interruption which is
possible from surface vessels. Our submarines
took a heavy toll but could not, by themselves,
prevent the invasion of Norway. In the Channel
and in the North Sea, on the other hand, our
superior naval surface forces, aided by our
submarines, will operate with close and
effective air assistance.
This brings me, naturally, to the great question
of invasion from the air, and of the impending
struggle between the British and German Air
Forces. It seems quite clear that no invasion on
a scale beyond the capacity of our land forces
to crush speedily is likely to take place from
the air until our Air Force has been definitely
overpowered. In the meantime, there may be raids
by parachute troops and attempted descents of
airborne soldiers. We should be able to give
those gentry a warm reception both in the air
and on the ground, if they reach it in any
condition to continue the dispute. But the great
question is: Can we break Hitler's air weapon?
Now, of course, it is a very great pity that we
have not got an Air Force at least equal to that
of the most powerful enemy within striking
distance of these shores. But we have a very
powerful Air Force which has proved itself far
superior in quality, both in men and in many
types of machine, to what we have met so far in
the numerous and fierce air battles which have
been fought with the Germans. In France, where
we were at a considerable disadvantage and lost
many machines on the ground when they were
standing round the aerodromes, we were
accustomed to inflict in the air losses of as
much as two and two-and-a-half to one. In the
fighting over Dunkirk, which was a sort of
no-man's-land, we undoubtedly beat the German
Air Force, and gained the mastery of the local
air, inflicting here a loss of three or four to
one day after day. Anyone who looks at the
photographs which were published a week or so
ago of the re-embarkation, showing the masses of
troops assembled on the beach and forming an
ideal target for hours at a time, must realize
that this re-embarkation would not have been
possible unless the enemy had resigned all hope
of recovering air superiority at that time and
at that place.
In the defense of this Island the advantages to
the defenders will be much greater than they
were in the fighting around Dunkirk. We hope to
improve on the rate of three or four to one
which was realized at Dunkirk; and in addition
all our injured machines and their crews which
get down safely-and, surprisingly, a very great
many injured machines and men do get down safely
in modern air fighting-all of these will fall,
in an attack upon these Islands, on friendly.
soil and live to fight another day; whereas all
the injured enemy machines and their complements
will be total losses as far as the war is
concerned.
During the great battle in France, we gave very
powerful and continuous aid to. the French Army,
both by fighters and bombers; but in spite of
every kind of pressure we never would allow the
entire metropolitan fighter strength of the Air
Force to be consumed. This decision was painful,
but it was also right, because the fortunes of
the battle in France could not have been
decisively affected even if we had thrown in our
entire fighter force. That battle was lost by
the unfortunate strategical opening, by the
extraordinary and unforseen power of the armored
columns, and by the great preponderance of the
German Army in numbers. Our fighter Air Force
might easily have been exhausted as a mere
accident in that great struggle, and then we
should have found ourselves at the present time
in a very serious plight. But as it is, I am
happy to inform the House that our fighter
strength is stronger at the present time
relatively to the Germans, who have suffered
terrible losses, than it has ever been; and
consequently we believe ourselves possessed of
the capacity to continue the war in the air
under better conditions than we have ever
experienced before. I look forward confidently
to the exploits of our fighter pilots-these
splendid men, this brilliant youth-who will have
the glory of saving their native land, their
island home, and all they love, from the most
deadly of all attacks.
There remains, of course, the danger of bombing
attacks, which will certainly be made very soon
upon us by the bomber forces of the enemy. It is
true that the German bomber force is superior in
numbers to ours; but we have a very large bomber
force also, which we shall use to strike at
military targets in Germany without
intermission. I do not at all underrate the
severity of the ordeal which lies before us; but
I believe our countrymen will show themselves
capable of standing up to it, like the brave men
of Barcelona, and will be able to stand up to
it, and carry on in spite of it, at least as
well as any other people in the world. Much will
depend upon this; every man and every woman will
have the chance to show the finest qualities of
their race, and render the highest service to
their cause. For all of us, at this time,
whatever our sphere, our station, our occupation
or our duties, it will be a help to remember the
famous lines: He nothing common did or mean,
Upon that memorable scene.
I have thought it right upon this occasion to
give the House and the country some indication
of the solid, practical grounds upon which we
base our inflexible resolve to continue the war.
There are a good many people who say, "Never
mind. Win or lose, sink or swim, better die than
submit to tyranny-and such a tyranny." And I do
not dissociate myself from them. But I can
assure them that our professional advisers of
the three Services unitedly advise that we
should carry on the war, and that there are good
and reasonable hopes of final victory. We have
fully informed and consulted all the
self-governing Dominions, these great
communities far beyond the oceans who have been
built up on our laws and on our civilization,
and who are absolutely free to choose their
course, but are absolutely devoted to the
ancient Motherland, and who feel themselves
inspired by the same emotions which lead me to
stake our all upon duty and honor. We have fully
consulted them, and I have received from their
Prime Ministers, Mr. Mackenzie King of Canada,
Mr. Menzies of Australia, Mr. Fraser of New
Zealand, and General Smuts of South Africa — that
wonderful man, with his immense profound mind,
and his eye watching from a distance the whole
panorama of European affairs — I have received
from all these eminent men, who all have
Governments behind them elected on wide
franchises, who are all there because they
represent the will of their people, messages
couched in the most moving terms in which they
endorse our decision to fight on, and declare
themselves ready to share our fortunes and to
persevere to the end. That is what we are going
to do.
We may now ask ourselves: In what way has our
position worsened since the beginning of the
war? It has worsened by the fact that the
Germans have conquered a large part of the coast
line of Western Europe, and many small countries
have been overrun by them. This aggravates the
possibilities of air attack and adds to our
naval preoccupations. It in no way diminishes,
but on the contrary definitely increases, the
power of our long-distance blockade. Similarly,
the entrance of Italy into the war increases the
power of our long-distance blockade. We have
stopped the worst leak by that. We do not know
whether military resistance will come to an end
in France or not, but should it do so, then of
course the Germans will be able to concentrate
their forces, both military and industrial, upon
us. But for the reasons I have given to the
House these will not be found so easy to apply.
If invasion has become more imminent, as no
doubt it has, we, being relieved from the task
of maintaining a large army in France, have far
larger and more efficient forces to meet it.
If Hitler can bring under his despotic control
the industries of the countries he has
conquered, this will add greatly to his already
vast armament output. On the other hand, this
will not happen immediately, and we are now
assured of immense, continuous and increasing
support in supplies and munitions of all kinds
from the United States; and especially of
aeroplanes and pilots from the Dominions and
across the oceans coming from regions which are
beyond the reach of enemy bombers.
I do not see how any of these factors can
operate to our detriment on balance before the
winter comes; and the winter will impose a
strain upon the Nazi regime, with almost all
Europe writhing and starving under its cruel
heel, which, for all their ruthlessness, will
run them very hard. We must not forget that from
the moment when we declared war on the 3rd
September it was always possible for Germany to
turn all her Air Force upon this country,
together with any other devices of invasion she
might conceive, and that France could have done
little or nothing to prevent her doing so. We
have, therefore, lived under this danger, in
principle and in a slightly modified form,
during all these m6nths. In the meanwhile,
however, we have enormously improved our methods
of defense, and we have learned what we had no
right to assume at the beginning, namely, that
the individual aircraft and the individual
British pilot have a sure and definite
superiority. Therefore, in casting up this dread
balancesheet and contemplating our dangers with
a disillusioned eye, I see great reason for
intense vigilance and exertion, but none
whatever for panic or despair.
During the first four years of the last war the
Allies experienced nothing but disaster and
disappointment. That was our constant fear: one
blow after another, terrible losses, frightful
dangers. Everything miscarried. And yet at the
end of those four years the morale of the Allies
was higher than that of the Germans, who had
moved from one aggressive triumph to another,
and who stood everywhere triumphant invaders of
the lands into which they had broken. During
that war we repeatedly asked ourselves the
question: How are we going to win? and no one
was able ever to answer it with much precision,
until at the end, quite suddenly, quite
unexpectedly, our terrible foe collapsed before
us, and we were so glutted with victory that in
our folly we threw it away.
We do not yet know what will happen in France or
whether the French resistance will be prolonged,
both in France and in the French Empire
overseas. The French Government will be throwing
away great opportunities and casting adrift
their future if they do not continue the war in
accordance with their Treaty obligations, from
which we have not felt able to release them. The
House will have read the historic declaration in
which, at the desire of many Frenchmen-and of
our own hearts-we have proclaimed our
willingness at the darkest hour in French
history to conclude a union of common
citizenship in this struggle. However matters
may go in France or with the French Government,
or other French Governments, we in this Island
and in the British Empire will never lose our
sense of comradeship with the French people. If
we are now called upon to endure what they have
been suffering, we shall emulate their courage,
and if final victory rewards our toils they
shall share the gains, aye, and freedom shall be
restored to all. We abate nothing of our just
demands; not one jot or tittle do we recede.
Czechs, Poles, Norwegians, Dutch, Belgians have
joined their causes to our own. All these shall
be restored.
What General Weygand called the Battle of France
is over. I expect that the Battle of Britain is
about to begin. Upon this battle depends the
survival of Christian civilization. Upon it
depends our own British life, and the long
continuity of our institutions and our Empire.
The whole fury and might of the enemy must very
soon be turned on us. Hitler knows that he will
have to break us in this Island or lose the war.
If we can stand up to him, all Europe may be
free and the life of the world may move forward
into broad, sunlit uplands. But if we fail, then
the whole world, including the United States,
including all that we have known and cared for,
will sink into the abyss of a new Dark Age made
more sinister, and perhaps more protracted, by
the lights of perverted science. Let us
therefore brace ourselves to our duties, and so
bear ourselves that, if the British Empire and
its Commonwealth last for a thousand years, men
will still say, "This was their finest hour."
Also called the
Persian Wars, the Greco-Persian Wars were
fought for almost half a century from 492 BC -
449 BC. Greece won against enormous odds. Here
is more:
