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I spoke the other day of the
colossal military disaster which occurred when the French High
Command failed to withdraw the northern Armies from Belgium at
the moment when they knew that the French front was decisively
broken at Sedan and on the Meuse. This delay entailed the loss
of fifteen or sixteen French divisions and threw out of action
for the critical period the whole of the British Expeditionary
Force. Our Army and 120,000 French troops were indeed rescued
by the British Navy from Dunkirk but only with the loss of
their cannon, vehicles and modern equipment. This loss
inevitably took some weeks to repair, and in the first two of
those weeks the battle in France has been lost. When we
consider the heroic resistance made by the French Army against
heavy odds in this battle, the enormous losses inflicted upon
the enemy and the evident exhaustion of the enemy, it may well
be the thought that these 25 divisions of the best-trained and
best-equipped troops might have turned the scale. However,
General Weygand had to fight without them. Only three British
divisions or their equivalent were able to stand in the line
with their French comrades. They have suffered severely, but
they have fought well. We sent every man we could to France as
fast as we could re-equip and transport their formations.
I am not reciting these facts for the purpose of
recrimination. That I judge to be utterly futile and even
harmful. We cannot afford it. I recite them in order to
explain why it was we did not have, as we could have had,
between twelve and fourteen British divisions fighting in the
line in this great battle instead of only three. Now I put all
this aside. I put it on the shelf, from which the historians,
when they have time, will select their documents to tell their
stories. We have to think of the future and not of the past.
This also applies in a small way to our own affairs at home.
There are many who would hold an inquest in the House of
Commons on the conduct of the Governments-and of Parliaments,
for they are in it, too-during the years which led up to this
catastrophe. They seek to indict those who were responsible
for the guidance of our affairs. This also would be a foolish
and pernicious process. There are too many in it. Let each man
search his conscience and search his speeches. I frequently
search mine.
Of this I am quite sure, that if we open a quarrel between the
past and the present, we shall find that we have lost the
future. Therefore, I cannot accept the drawing of any
distinctions between Members of the present Government. It was
formed at a moment of crisis in order to unite all the Parties
and all sections of opinion. It has received the almost
unanimous support of both Houses of Parliament. Its Members
are going to stand together, and, subject to the authority of
the House of Commons, we are going to govern the country and
fight the war. It is absolutely necessary at a time like this
that every Minister who tries each day to do his duty shall be
respected; and their subordinates must know that their chiefs
are not threatened men, men who are here today and gone
tomorrow, but that their directions must be punctually and
faithfully obeyed. Without this concentrated power we cannot
face what lies before us. I should not think it would be very
advantageous for the House to prolong this Debate this
afternoon under conditions of public stress. Many facts are
not clear that will be clear in a short time. We are to have a
secret Session on Thursday, and I should think that would be a
better opportunity for the many earnest expressions of opinion
which Members will desire to make and for the House to discuss
vital matters without having everything read the next morning
by our dangerous foes.
The disastrous military events which have happened during the
past fortnight have not come to me with any sense of surprise.
Indeed, I indicated a fortnight ago as clearly as I could to
the House that the worst possibilities were open; and I made
it perfectly clear then that whatever happened in France would
make no difference to the resolve of Britain and the British
Empire to fight on, '~f necessary for years, if necessary
alone." During the last few days we have successfully brought
off the great majority of the troops we had on the line of
communication in France; and seven-eighths of the troops we
have sent to France since the beginning of the war-that is to
say, about 350,000 out of 400,000 men-are safely back in this
country. Others are still fighting with the French, and
fighting with considerable success in their local encounters
against the enemy. We have also brought back a great mass of
stores, rifles and munitions of all kinds which had been
accumulated in France during the last nine months.
We have, therefore, in this Island today a very large and
powerful military force. This force comprises all our
best-trained and our finest troops, including scores of
thousands of those who have already measured their quality
against the Germans and found themselves at no disadvantage.
We have under arms at the present time in this Island over a
million and a quarter men. Behind these we have the Local
Defense Volunteers, numbering half a million, only a portion
of whom, however, are yet armed with rifles or other firearms.
We have incorporated into our Defense Forces every man for
whom we have a weapon. We expect very large additions to our
weapons in the near future, and in preparation for this we
intend forthwith to call up, drill and train further large
numbers. Those who are not called up, or else are employed
during the vast business of munitions production in all its
branches-and their ramifications are innumerable-will serve
their country best by remaining at their ordinary work until
they receive their summons. We have also over here Dominions
armies. The Canadians had actually landed in France, but have
now been safely withdrawn, much disappointed, but in perfect
order, with all their artillery and equipment. And these very
high-class forces from the Dominions will now take part in the
defense of the Mother Country.
Lest the account which I have given of these large forces
should raise the question: Why did they not take part in the
great battle in France? I must make it clear that, apart from
the divisions training and organizing at home, only 12
divisions were equipped to fight upon a scale which justified
their being sent abroad. And this was fully up to the number
which the French had been led to expect would be available in
France at the ninth month of the war. The rest of our forces
at home have a fighting value for home defense which will, of
course, steadily increase every week that passes. Thus, the
invasion of Great Britain would at this time require the
transportation across the sea of hostile armies on a very
large scale, and after they had been so transported they would
have to be continually maintained with all the masses of
munitions and supplies which are required for continuous
battle-as continuous battle it will surely be.
Here is where we come to the Navy-and after all, we have a
Navy. Some people seem to forget that we have a Navy. We must
remind them. For the last thirty years I have been concerned
in discussions about the possibilities of oversea invasion,
and I took the responsibility on behalf of the Admiralty, at
the beginning of the last war, of allowing all regular troops
to be sent out of the country. That was a very serious step to
take, because our Territorials had only just been called up
and were quite untrained. Therefore, this Island was for
several months particularly denuded of fighting troops. The
Admiralty had confidence at that time in their ability to
prevent a mass invasion even though at that time the Germans
had a magnificent battle fleet in the proportion of 10 to 16,
even though they were capable of fighting a general engagement
every day and any day, whereas now they have only a couple of
heavy ships worth speaking of-the Scharnhorst and the
Gneisenau. We are also told that the Italian Navy is to come
out and gain sea superiority in these waters. If they
seriously intend it, I shall only say that we shall be
delighted to offer Signor Mussolini a free and safeguarded
passage through the Strait of Gibraltar in order that he may
play the part to which he aspires. There is a general
curiosity in the British Fleet to find out whether the
Italians are up to the level they were at in the last war or
whether they have fallen off at all.
Therefore, it seems to me that as far as sea-borne invasion on
a great scale is concerned, we are far more capable of meeting
it today than we were at many periods in the last war and
during the early months of this war, before our other troops
were trained, and while the B.E.F. had proceeded abroad. Now,
the Navy have never pretended to be able to prevent raids by
bodies of 5,000 or 10,000 men flung suddenly across and thrown
ashore at several points on the coast some dark night or foggy
morning. The efficacy of sea power, especially under modern
conditions, depends upon the invading force being of large
size; It has to be of large size, in view of our military
strength, to be of any use. If it is of large size, then the
Navy have something they can find and meet and, as it were,
bite on. Now, we must remember that even five divisions,
however lightly equipped, would require 200 to 250 ships, and
with modern air reconnaissance and photography it would not be
easy to collect such an armada, marshal it, and conduct it
across the sea without any powerful naval forces to escort it;
and there would be very great possibilities, to put it mildly,
that this armada would be intercepted long before it reached
the coast, and all the men drowned in the sea or, at the worst
blown to pieces with their equipment while they were trying to
land. We also have a great system of minefields, recently
strongly reinforced, through which we alone know the channels.
If the enemy tries to sweep passages through these minefields,
it will be the task of the Navy to destroy the mine-sweepers
and any other forces employed to protect them. There should be
no difficulty in this, owing to our great superiority at sea.
Those are the regular, well-tested, well-proved arguments on
which we have relied during many years in peace and war. But
the question is whether there are any new methods by which
those solid assurances can be circumvented. Odd as it may
seem, some attention has been given to this by the Admiralty,
whose prime duty and responsibility is to destroy any large
sea-borne expedition before it reaches, or at the moment when
it reaches, these shores. It would not be a good thing for me
to go into details of this. It might suggest ideas to other
people which they have not thought of, and they would not be
likely to give us any of their ideas in exchange. All I will
say is that untiring vigilance and mind-searching must be
devoted to the subject, because the enemy is crafty and
cunning and full of novel treacheries and stratagems. The
House may be assured that the utmost ingenuity is being
displayed and imagination is being evoked from large numbers
of competent officers, well-trained in tactics and thoroughly
up to date, to measure and counterwork novel possibilities.
Untiring vigilance and untiring searching of the mind is
being, and must be, devoted to the subject, because, remember,
the enemy is crafty and there is no dirty trick he will not
do.
Some people will ask why, then, was it that the British Navy
was not able to prevent the movement of a large army from
Germany into Norway across the Skagerrak? But the conditions
in the Channel and in the North Sea are in no way like those
which prevail in the Skagerrak. In the Skagerrak, because of
the distance, we could give no air support to our surface
ships, and consequently, lying as we did close to the enemy's
main air power, we were compelled to use only our submarines.
We could not enforce the decisive blockade or interruption
which is possible from surface vessels. Our submarines took a
heavy toll but could not, by themselves, prevent the invasion
of Norway. In the Channel and in the North Sea, on the other
hand, our superior naval surface forces, aided by our
submarines, will operate with close and effective air
assistance.
This brings me, naturally, to the great question of invasion
from the air, and of the impending struggle between the
British and German Air Forces. It seems quite clear that no
invasion on a scale beyond the capacity of our land forces to
crush speedily is likely to take place from the air until our
Air Force has been definitely overpowered. In the meantime,
there may be raids by parachute troops and attempted descents
of airborne soldiers. We should be able to give those gentry a
warm reception both in the air and on the ground, if they
reach it in any condition to continue the dispute. But the
great question is: Can we break Hitler's air weapon? Now, of
course, it is a very great pity that we have not got an Air
Force at least equal to that of the most powerful enemy within
striking distance of these shores. But we have a very powerful
Air Force which has proved itself far superior in quality,
both in men and in many types of machine, to what we have met
so far in the numerous and fierce air battles which have been
fought with the Germans. In France, where we were at a
considerable disadvantage and lost many machines on the ground
when they were standing round the aerodromes, we were
accustomed to inflict in the air losses of as much as two and
two-and-a-half to one. In the fighting over Dunkirk, which was
a sort of no-man's-land, we undoubtedly beat the German Air
Force, and gained the mastery of the local air, inflicting
here a loss of three or four to one day after day. Anyone who
looks at the photographs which were published a week or so ago
of the re-embarkation, showing the masses of troops assembled
on the beach and forming an ideal target for hours at a time,
must realize that this re-embarkation would not have been
possible unless the enemy had resigned all hope of recovering
air superiority at that time and at that place.
In the defense of this Island the advantages to the defenders
will be much greater than they were in the fighting around
Dunkirk. We hope to improve on the rate of three or four to
one which was realized at Dunkirk; and in addition all our
injured machines and their crews which get down safely-and,
surprisingly, a very great many injured machines and men do
get down safely in modern air fighting-all of these will fall,
in an attack upon these Islands, on friendly. soil and live to
fight another day; whereas all the injured enemy machines and
their complements will be total losses as far as the war is
concerned.
During the great battle in France, we gave very powerful and
continuous aid to. the French Army, both by fighters and
bombers; but in spite of every kind of pressure we never would
allow the entire metropolitan fighter strength of the Air
Force to be consumed. This decision was painful, but it was
also right, because the fortunes of the battle in France could
not have been decisively affected even if we had thrown in our
entire fighter force. That battle was lost by the unfortunate
strategical opening, by the extraordinary and unforseen power
of the armored columns, and by the great preponderance of the
German Army in numbers. Our fighter Air Force might easily
have been exhausted as a mere accident in that great struggle,
and then we should have found ourselves at the present time in
a very serious plight. But as it is, I am happy to inform the
House that our fighter strength is stronger at the present
time relatively to the Germans, who have suffered terrible
losses, than it has ever been; and consequently we believe
ourselves possessed of the capacity to continue the war in the
air under better conditions than we have ever experienced
before. I look forward confidently to the exploits of our
fighter pilots-these splendid men, this brilliant youth-who
will have the glory of saving their native land, their island
home, and all they love, from the most deadly of all attacks.
There remains, of course, the danger of bombing attacks, which
will certainly be made very soon upon us by the bomber forces
of the enemy. It is true that the German bomber force is
superior in numbers to ours; but we have a very large bomber
force also, which we shall use to strike at military targets
in Germany without intermission. I do not at all underrate the
severity of the ordeal which lies before us; but I believe our
countrymen will show themselves capable of standing up to it,
like the brave men of Barcelona, and will be able to stand up
to it, and carry on in spite of it, at least as well as any
other people in the world. Much will depend upon this; every
man and every woman will have the chance to show the finest
qualities of their race, and render the highest service to
their cause. For all of us, at this time, whatever our sphere,
our station, our occupation or our duties, it will be a help
to remember the famous lines: He nothing common did or mean,
Upon that memorable scene.
I have thought it right upon this occasion to give the House
and the country some indication of the solid, practical
grounds upon which we base our inflexible resolve to continue
the war. There are a good many people who say, "Never mind.
Win or lose, sink or swim, better die than submit to
tyranny-and such a tyranny." And I do not dissociate myself
from them. But I can assure them that our professional
advisers of the three Services unitedly advise that we should
carry on the war, and that there are good and reasonable hopes
of final victory. We have fully informed and consulted all the
self-governing Dominions, these great communities far beyond
the oceans who have been built up on our laws and on our
civilization, and who are absolutely free to choose their
course, but are absolutely devoted to the ancient Motherland,
and who feel themselves inspired by the same emotions which
lead me to stake our all upon duty and honor. We have fully
consulted them, and I have received from their Prime
Ministers, Mr. Mackenzie King of Canada, Mr. Menzies of
Australia, Mr. Fraser of New Zealand, and General Smuts of
South Africa-that wonderful man, with his immense profound
mind, and his eye watching from a distance the whole panorama
of European affairs-I have received from all these eminent
men, who all have Governments behind them elected on wide
franchises, who are all there because they represent the will
of their people, messages couched in the most moving terms in
which they endorse our decision to fight on, and declare
themselves ready to share our fortunes and to persevere to the
end. That is what we are going to do.
We may now ask ourselves: In what way has our position
worsened since the beginning of the war? It has worsened by
the fact that the Germans have conquered a large part of the
coast line of Western Europe, and many small countries have
been overrun by them. This aggravates the possibilities of air
attack and adds to our naval preoccupations. It in no way
diminishes, but on the contrary definitely increases, the
power of our long-distance blockade. Similarly, the entrance
of Italy into the war increases the power of our long-distance
blockade. We have stopped the worst leak by that. We do not
know whether military resistance will come to an end in France
or not, but should it do so, then of course the Germans will
be able to concentrate their forces, both military and
industrial, upon us. But for the reasons I have given to the
House these will not be found so easy to apply. If invasion
has become more imminent, as no doubt it has, we, being
relieved from the task of maintaining a large army in France,
have far larger and more efficient forces to meet it.
If Hitler can bring under his despotic control the industries
of the countries he has conquered, this will add greatly to
his already vast armament output. On the other hand, this will
not happen immediately, and we are now assured of immense,
continuous and increasing support in supplies and munitions of
all kinds from the United States; and especially of aeroplanes
and pilots from the Dominions and across the oceans coming
from regions which are beyond the reach of enemy bombers.
I do not see how any of these factors can operate to our
detriment on balance before the winter comes; and the winter
will impose a strain upon the Nazi regime, with almost all
Europe writhing and starving under its cruel heel, which, for
all their ruthlessness, will run them very hard. We must not
forget that from the moment when we declared war on the 3rd
September it was always possible for Germany to turn all her
Air Force upon this country, together with any other devices
of invasion she might conceive, and that France could have
done little or nothing to prevent her doing so. We have,
therefore, lived under this danger, in principle and in a
slightly modified form, during all these m6nths. In the
meanwhile, however, we have enormously improved our methods of
defense, and we have learned what we had no right to assume at
the beginning, namely, that the individual aircraft and the
individual British pilot have a sure and definite superiority.
Therefore, in casting up this dread balancesheet and
contemplating our dangers with a disillusioned eye, I see
great reason for intense vigilance and exertion, but none
whatever for panic or despair.
During the first four years of the last war the Allies
experienced nothing but disaster and disappointment. That was
our constant fear: one blow after another, terrible losses,
frightful dangers. Everything miscarried. And yet at the end
of those four years the morale of the Allies was higher than
that of the Germans, who had moved from one aggressive triumph
to another, and who stood everywhere triumphant invaders of
the lands into which they had broken. During that war we
repeatedly asked ourselves the question: How are we going to
win? and no one was able ever to answer it with much
precision, until at the end, quite suddenly, quite
unexpectedly, our terrible foe collapsed before us, and we
were so glutted with victory that in our folly we threw it
away.
We do not yet know what will happen in France or whether the
French resistance will be prolonged, both in France and in the
French Empire overseas. The French Government will be throwing
away great opportunities and casting adrift their future if
they do not continue the war in accordance with their Treaty
obligations, from which we have not felt able to release them.
The House will have read the historic declaration in which, at
the desire of many Frenchmen-and of our own hearts-we have
proclaimed our willingness at the darkest hour in French
history to conclude a union of common citizenship in this
struggle. However matters may go in France or with the French
Government, or other French Governments, we in this Island and
in the British Empire will never lose our sense of comradeship
with the French people. If we are now called upon to endure
what they have been suffering, we shall emulate their courage,
and if final victory rewards our toils they shall share the
gains, aye, and freedom shall be restored to all. We abate
nothing of our just demands; not one jot or tittle do we
recede. Czechs, Poles, Norwegians, Dutch, Belgians have joined
their causes to our own. All these shall be restored.
What General Weygand called the Battle of France is over. I
expect that the Battle of Britain is about to begin. Upon this
battle depends the survival of Christian civilization. Upon it
depends our own British life, and the long continuity of our
institutions and our Empire. The whole fury and might of the
enemy must very soon be turned on us. Hitler knows that he
will have to break us in this Island or lose the war. If we
can stand up to him, all Europe may be free and the life of
the world may move forward into broad, sunlit uplands. But if
we fail, then the whole world, including the United States,
including all that we have known and cared for, will sink into
the abyss of a new Dark Age made more sinister, and perhaps
more protracted, by the lights of perverted science. Let us
therefore brace ourselves to our duties, and so bear ourselves
that, if the British Empire and its Commonwealth last for a
thousand years, men will still say, "This was their finest
hour."
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